Counter-UAS: Diverse Defenses for Drone Wars

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• 💸 🏢 How to Mitigate the sUAS Problem (Another Joint Office?!)

• 💰 Term Sheet

• 🚩 Red Team Update

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How to Mitigate the sUAS Problem (Another Joint Office?!)

It’s not immediately apparent, but this might be what 21st century aerial dogfighting looks like - at least between small UAS (sUAS):

This video from late 2022 reportedly shows a Ukrainian-owned DJI Mavic intercepting a Russian drone by flying into it.

Back in 2019, Marines on the USS Boxer downed a fixed-wing Iranian drone using their Marine Air Defense Integrated System (MADIS) - which just achieved full-rate production - while transiting the Strait of Hormuz. “The MADIS Mk2 (C-UAS variant) includes a multi-function EW capability, 360-degree radar, direct fire weapon, EO/IR optic, and supporting C2 communications suite.” Then there’s the Marine Corps’ acquisition plans for I-CSUAS (Installation-Counter Small UAS), which sounds like sensor fusion for detection, tracking, and identification with EW jamming of the sUAS comms link.

And one of the defining characteristics of the war in Ukraine so far has been the proliferation and adoption of commercial UAS for military purposes, making those systems an exemplar of dual-use technology, which we covered previously. While commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) UAS don’t pack the explosive punch of larger military-grade drones, their use as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms, or missile surrogates in the form of kamikaze drones (mostly as human in the loop as first-person racing drones) is being proven in real-time.

At the same time, Russia has robust EW countermeasures for disabling sUAS, with systems placed about every 10 km along its front, resulting in Ukraine losing approximately 10,000 drones per month thus far.

Another means to defeat sUAS popular with DoD is the use of directed energy weapons. If you get the power requirements right, they effectively offer unlimited magazines and effectors at the speed of light. The Air Force has its 15 kW laser on its vehicle-mounted High-Energy Laser Weapon System (HELWS), the Navy its 30 kW Laser Weapon System (LaWS) - as well as the Optical Dazzling Interdictor (ODIN) and the High-Energy Laser with Integrated Optical Dazzler and Surveillance System (HELIOS). And the USMC acquisition office building the MADIS we mentioned above is procuring the “first DOD-approved ground-based laser,” the Compact Laser Weapon System (CLaWS).

It turns out that the Army is the only service that’s explicitly published a C-UAS strategy to guide its efforts, which it did in July 2016. So far, its directed energy capability is being developed through its six-layered air and missile defense concept, which features a family of laser capability with a 100 kW Multi-Mission High-Energy Laser (MMHEL) being one instantiation:

For the Army, no good deed (writing service guidance on C-UAS) goes unpunished. In 2019, the DoD named the Army the executive agent to oversee all C-sUAS development efforts. Then in 2020, the Joint C-sUAS Office (JCO) was established and released a Counter-Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Strategy in 2021, which is light on material solutions and heavy on aspirational unity of effort language. Though at least it does explicitly define DoD’s view of sUAs as Groups 3 and below:

Classification of unmanned aircraft systems is divided into five category groups. The first three categories represent smaller, low-cost drones, whose rapid proliferation can threaten personnel and critical assets (reference the ongoing drone operations in Ukraine). Groups four and five identify larger UAS typically controlled by state-actors.

According to the Army, close to 90% of the Army’s counter-drone capabilities are electronic warfare systems, utilizing lasers and microwaves to disrupt the communication between device and operator(s). The evolving threat today is autonomous drones or loitering munitions that can search for targets and prosecute a target without a human in the loop. Another concerning aspect is swarming capabilities that both China and Russia are said to have in their arsenals, where the intent of swarming is to saturate any sort of aerial defense system meant to protect an asset or use autonomy for smarter weapon collaboration. An increased number of threats in a swarm, cheaply produced and operated, can potentially overwhelm a C-sUAS system or operator, as well.

To counter this rapidly evolving threat, the JCO realized an agile acquisition process was necessary (here and almost everywhere else in DoD…). The division Chief for Strategy and Policy at the Joint Office stated, “Some of the acquisition processes that are better suited for longer lead times will not work in this type of environment. So, we just, as a department [of defense], need to be flexible so that we can continue to get after the threat, to keep pace or stay ahead of it. That is applicable to anywhere else the technology is evolving.” AoT agrees, and we want to highlight the recent investments the DoD has made in C-UAS among defense startups:

• Anduril Industries - $1B contract awarded by SOCOM to integrate its Lattice Operating System with Sentry Tower and C-sUAS Anvil system

• Epirus - $66M contract awarded by the US Army for the Leonidas directed energy system, a proven high-power microwave (HPM) counter-swarm capability

• BlueHalo - $24M contract awarded by DoD for TITAN counter-drone system, providing layered C-UAS defense

The FY2024 RDT&E Budget Request includes:

• $64M for “Counter - Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Advanced Development” (Army, 6.4 Advanced Components and Prototypes funding)

• $36M for “Counter - Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Sys Dev & Demonstration” (6.5 Systems Development and Demonstration funding)

• $12M for “Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C-UAS)” (Navy, 6.4)

There’s always more money we can’t see (even unclassified), buried in other line items or programs or called different names, but $112M for RDT&E helps give a sense of the attention C-UAS is getting, at least explicitly in DoD’s RDT&E department: less than 0.1% of the requested FY24 budget of $145B. Let’s hope there’s more money in procurement of C-UAS systems (see the examples above)…

These Service examples and contracts above represent the broad ways to defeat sUAS:

• Non-Kinetic (i.e., electronic warfare)

  1. Signal jamming or takeover (disrupt ability for human to fly the drone from somewhere else)

  2. GPS spoofing (make the drone think it is somewhere else and cause it to crash)

  3. Directed-energy (lasers, microwaves)

• Kinetic

  1. sUAS vs. sUAS (the best drone hunter is another drone - this doesn’t scale well)

  2. Couple sensors (electro-optical/infrared/acoustic) with traditional munitions (e.g., rockets/missiles or machine guns - lower cost per shot)

  3. Mechanical means (nets, barriers, etc.)

  4. Birds of prey (no, seriously…)

We’ve seen that DoD is heavy into directed energy, which promises very low cost per shot once you amortize the development costs over the many, many shots you expect to take. Of course, they also require lots of energy to operate. Being that UAS is inherently dual-use, what are commercial companies doing in this space? It’s a dynamic space with companies maneuvering across all angles of C-UAS because it’s such a big problem (or opportunity) with the rapid global proliferation of commercial drones.

The total market size estimate for 2022 C-UAS ranges from a low of $1B+ to a high of $1.58B, predicted to grow to almost $7B by 2029 (not just for defense - civil infrastructure needs protection as well, and it’s not too far-fetched to imagine residential keep-out systems in the future). We highlight a few examples below:

• Core products: DefenseOS (CUAS command and control software), Sawtooth (HW stack with kinetic and non-kinetic effectors), Goshawk (GPS jammer)

• Market: dual-use

• Acquired by Highlander Partners in January 2023 for $undisclosed

• Core products: Anti-UAS defense system (AUDS) with net and directional RF jamming, Skywall handheld system that launches a drone-engangling net

• Market: dual-use (you can even lease!)

• Acquired by Highlander Partners in November 2022 for $undisclosed

• Core products: DedroneTactical, DedroneFixedSite, DedroneCityWide (AI-enabled C2 for airspace security, jamming)

• Market: dual-use (PGA and NASCAR, Warren AFB, etc.)

• Raised $30M in Series C-1 led by Axon in July 2023

When all else fails, all that Duck Hunt on Nintendo may finally pay off:

Red Team Update

China Develops C-sUAS Program Focused on US Drones

The People’s Liberation Army has admitted that advancements in UAS technology has hampered traditional air defenses. The PLA admitted they need three-dimensional, multidomain networks of detection equipment (sound familiar?!) and counter drone weapons to maximize the range and speed of early warning defense. Specifically the article states they will need networked anti-air guns, electronic interference to disrupt navigation and communications, directed-energy beams (i.e. the one pictured above), high microwave weapons and autonomous counter-drone systems that have swarming capabilities.

China’s Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation, the state-owned aerospace company produced the LW-30 mobile laser directed energy weapon. The system is built around the HQ-17AE short range air defense system and exhibits the three-dimensional network design of integrated counter-UAS technology. The company claims this system is effective against UAS, fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft, cruise missiles and air-to-ground weapons. The network also incorporates man-portable anti-air systems along with a ZR-1500 smart defense system which can be equipped with loitering munitions and direct fire weapons.

The article validates the extent of China’s counter-UAS investment and development. China’s Poly Technologies, Electronics Technology Corporation and Academy of Engineering and Physics are all working on developing the necessary technology that would be needed in an integrated counter-UAS air defense suite.

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Our team has 30+ years of combined experience as military officers using the end products. We’ve worked in both government and industry. From MIT to Wharton, Wall Street to biotech, and DARPA to th e flightline, we offer you a unique perspective on how to navigate America’s defense tech industry.

The opinions expressed in this newsletter are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of DoD, our employers or any affiliated organization. This newsletter is for informational purposes only and is not intended to provide legal, financial or professional advice